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I. INTRODUCTION
The history of man's ability to communicate is a history of techno-
logical innovation. The printing press, wire communications, the
telephone; all revolutionized the way people are able to speak to one an-
other. Now, in the throes of an "information revolution" that is reshaping
how we acquire, analyze, and disseminate information, another technol-
ogy is transforming global communication. The Internet has
simultaneously shrunk the world to the size of a keyboard and expanded
our horizons by making it far easier to find and distribute information.
However, with this new luxury come substantial burdens which cannot
* J.D., expected May 2008, University of Michigan Law School. The author wishes
to thank Professor Leonard Niehoff for his suggestions and guidance during the formation of
this Note.
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be ignored. Today politicians, citizens, legal experts, and regulators face
a growing list of thorny new issues prompted by the fantastically rapid
rise of the Internet. As decision makers struggle to rein in some of the
more problematic Internet-related issues, scholars and students must step
back and question both the methods and rationales these decision makers
employ.
One does not normally think of attorneys as being on the cutting
edge of anything. Often pigeonholed as creatures curiously beholden to
historical precedent, most view lawyers as grudging adapters to technol-
ogy, rather than innovators. However, in the world of online web logs (or
"blogs"), one of the Internet's most recent innovations, lawyers are lead-
ing the way. Though some dispute the true motivations which underlie
the adoption of this technology by many in the profession,' it is undeni-
able that lawyers are having a significant impact on the so-called
"blogosphere."2 However, the enthusiastic adoption of this new technol-
ogy by many lawyers gives rise to important questions which implicate
the unique rules of ethics that guide lawyers. The purpose of this Note is
to investigate those rules of ethics which interact with attorney blogs,
placing a special emphasis on advertising rules. The central finding is
that, under the Supreme Court's current First Amendment jurisprudence,
attorney blogs (or, more cleverly, "blawgs") are not subject to regulation
by the ethics codes of the ABA or the various state bars. Furthermore, if
the Supreme Court were to, for some reason, construe blawgs as falling
outside of First Amendment protection, evidence suggests that regulating
this new medium would be neither desirable nor effective.
Part II outlines the historical framework which underlies regulation
of attorney advertising, in an attempt to add some context to the debate
over attorney blawgs. Part III compares current ethics rules and jurispru-
dence on the issue to what is known about blawgs thus far, concluding
that blawgs neither fall under the purview of current ethics rules, nor are
likely to be subjected to future restrictions given the Supreme Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence surrounding attorney advertising. De-
spite this conclusion, the Note conveys some important practical advice
supporting the use of comprehensive disclaimers on attorney blawgs.
Part IV advances a short public policy argument derived from an eco-
nomics-based analysis of the blawgosphere. The Note advances the
argument that attempts to regulate blawgs would not only stifle the me-
dium, but could also make the medium more, rather than less, dangerous.
I. See infra Part III.B (outlining various perspectives on how blawgs may be utilized
as marketing tools).
2. See Blawg.com, http://www.blawg.com/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2008), for a tracking of
the number of lawyer blogs on the Internet. As of this writing, blawg.com tracks more than
2000 attorney blogs.
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Part V uses the experience of blawgs to briefly explore the efficacy of
restrictions on attorney advertising as a whole, concluding that the no-
tion of the blawgosphere calls into question the true motives behind such
restrictions.
II. THE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK3
In law school students are told that they are entering a venerated pro-
fession, as opposed to a "mere" occupation, and are admonished to
conduct themselves ethically. 4 Yet, while lawyers publicly deride those
who devalue their work, privately members of the bar seem content with
the sniping and bickering that characterize many other professions. 5 It is
this dynamic that, in part, makes the history of what is now known as
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 7.1 through 7.3 so interesting. Os-
tensibly crafted nearly 100 years ago to raise the public's general regard
for lawyers,6 the rules historically have more to do with the internal dy-
namics of the profession than protecting the rule of law and "officers of
the court."7
Legal advertising has not always been seen as a social faux paux.
Lawrence Friedman notes, in his seminal work on the history of Ameri-
can law, the importance of legal advertising in the development of a legal
industry in America's frontier lands during the nineteenth century.
Friedman outlines:
Courtroom clients were a shifting if not shiftless lot. House
counsel was unknown, though in time successful lawyers and af-
fluent clients did enter into occasional retainer agreements. Most
lawyers were constantly hunting for new business and were in
constant need of advertisements for themselves. There was no
prohibition against advertising in the literal sense, and lawyers
3. Scholarship on the historical development of codes of ethics in general and legal
ethics in particular is a rich area of inquiry which can span perspectives as wide and varied as
economics, sociology, psychology, and historical narrative. This historical summary represents
a brief overview of a very broad field.
4. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
5. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Professionalism, Legal Advertising, and Free Speech in the
Wake of Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 49 ARK. L. REV. 703, 705-08 (1997).
6. HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 25 (1953) ("The consequent weakening of an
effective professional public opinion clearly called for a more definite statement by the bar of
the accepted rules of professional conduct."); JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAW-
YERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 41-42 (1976).
7. AUERBACH, supra note 6, at 41-42 (1976).
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reached out for the public through notices ("cards") in the news-
8papers.
Indeed, advertising played an important role in the lives of lawyers
for almost one hundred years. However, around the turn of the twentieth
Century, the evolution of the American lawyer sparked concerns about
the deprofessionalization of attorneys.9 Prominent legal minds of the
time worried that on one hand the creation of "white shoe" Wall Street
law firms precipitated an image of lawyers as economically motivated
barbarians willing to manipulate the law for their own financial gain.' °
On the other hand, legal scholars found unsettling the "ambulance
chaser" image of some lawyers, as an entire legal industry had developed
which served the great and growing population of the underclass in
America." Goaded by President Theodore Roosevelt's landmark speech
at the Harvard Law School in 1905, American Bar Association President
Henry St. George Tucker led a group of ABA officials who, one year
after Roosevelt's speech, called for a formal attorney code of profes-
sional ethics.' 2  The ABA committee, influenced by the
overrepresentation of corporate lawyers in its ranks,'3 notably ignored
half of Roosevelt's charge. Rather than craft an even-handed code of eth-
ics, the committee called for a code which blatantly favored big law firm
lawyers, to the detriment of attorneys with smaller practices.' 4 Thus be-
gan the wholesale reinvention of conventional wisdom with regard to
lawyer advertising, as the bar turned dramatically from Friedman's fron-
tier lawyer mentality to one that rewarded power, prestige, and money.
The ABA consulted two primary sources to develop its new code of
ethics for legal advertising.' 5 First, it looked to George Sharswood's Es-
say on Professional Ethics.'6 In his 1854 essay, Sharswood assumed an
overtly moralistic, if not blatantly religious, tone in which he empha-
sized character, honor, and duty.' 7 Sharswood concluded that "moral
dignity" necessarily held that lawyers should not seek clients, but instead
"let business seek the young attorney.'"'8 According to one commentator,
by the twentieth century this view of lawyers was simply outdated as it
"presupposed the vanished homogenous community whose lawyers were
8. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 230-31 (3d. ed. 2005).
9. AUERBACH, supra note 6, at 40.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 40-41.
13. LOUISE L. HILL, LAWYER ADVERTISING 43-44 (1993).
14. AUERBACH, supra note 6, at 41; HILL, supra note 13, at 44.
15. HILL, supra note 13, at 42.
16. AUERBACH, supra note 6, at 41.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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known, visible, and accessible, and whose citizens recognized their own
legal problems and knew where to turn for assistance."'9 In reality,
Sharswood's view, and the rule adopted by the ABA as Canon 27 simply
"served as a club against lawyers whose clients were excluded from that
culture: especially the urban poor, new immigrants, and blue-collar
workers. 20 Second, the ABA looked to the Alabama Code of Ethics
(1887), itself a product of Sharswood's scholarship, to develop its can-
ons.2 ' Though the Alabama Code specifically prohibited the individual
solicitation of clients, it did not go so far as to ban all forms of advertis-
ing.22 Interestingly, the ABA as a whole failed to adhere to Alabama's
admirable exercise in restraint.
23
In 1908 the ABA published its Canons of Professional Ethics, which
24included Canon 27 prohibiting all lawyer advertising. As noted earlier,
those lawyers charged with creating and administering the rule were
overwhelmingly employed by "white shoe" law firms with settled prac-
tices.2' The rule unsurprisingly benefited wealthy big-firm lawyers andpunihedattr eswih al r • 26
punished attorneys with smaller practices. This blanket prohibition on
advertising existed in almost the exact same form until the ABA adopted
its Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969.27 However, the
Model Code brought no major changes to the advertising prohibition of
the Canons, and incorporated the same general sentiment into Discipli-
nary Rule 2-101.28 Thus, the broad-based prohibition that began with
Sharswood and the Canons of Professional Ethics remained in place for
almost 70 years, until the Supreme Court issued its sweeping decision in
Bates v. State Bar ofArizona.9
The first case in which the Supreme Court squarely addressed the is-
sue of attorney advertising, Bates represented a dramatic shift in thought
regarding the ethics of lawyer advertising. The facts of the case were
relatively unremarkable. As was true with many state bars around the
country, Arizona had promulgated a disciplinary rule, under the auspices
of the Arizona State Supreme Court, which restricted the ability of attor-
neys to advertise their services. 0 The rule read, in part:
19. Id. at 42.
20. Id.
21. HILL, supra note 13, at 42; DRINKER, supra note 6, at 23 n.7.
22. HILL, supra note 13, at 42.




27. Id. at 44.
28. Id. at 45.
29. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
30. Id. at 353.
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(B) A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or asso-
ciate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a
lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or
television announcements, display advertisements in the city or
telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity,
nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.'
The rule included several exceptions which allowed for political ad-
vertisements, legal publications, and the like.32 Subsequently, John Bates
and Van O'Steen published an advertisement in the Arizona Republic
which broadcasted "legal services at very reasonable fees" and listed
their rates for certain routine matters.33 Drawing some guidance from its
ruling in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council,34 the
Court found that the advertisement created by Bates and O'Steen
amounted to commercial speech and that, in general, "such speech
serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable
decision-making.' 5 Somewhat bizarrely, the Court methodically picked
apart every pro-restriction argument advanced by the State Bar of Ari-36
zona, while it simultaneously emphasized the narrow nature of its
holding.33 Ultimately, the Court found that a state may not prevent a law-
yer from publishing a "truthful advertisement concerning the availability
and terms of routine legal services.""
In Bates the Supreme Court purposefully left certain major questions
unresolved. However, the Justices were forced to confront some of the
issues they sought to avoid in Bates only one year later in the companion
cases of Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association" and In re Primus. ° In
Ohralik the Court encountered what seasoned trial attorneys call a "bad
facts" case. Albert Ohralik was a licensed attorney practicing in Mont-
ville and Cleveland, Ohio. After learning about a car accident involving
one Carol McClintock, Mr. Ohralik pursued both Ms. McClintock's par-
31. Id. at 355.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 354.
34. Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (holding that so-
called "commercial speech" was protected by the First Amendment, albeit on a somewhat
diminished level).
35. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, at 364 (1977).
36. Id. at 368-79.
37. See id. at 367-68 ("The heart of the dispute before us today is whether lawyers also
may constitutionally advertise the prices at which certain routine services will be performed.")
(emphasis added); Id. at 384 ("The constitutional issue in this case is only whether the state
may prevent the publication in a newspaper of appellants' truthful advertisement concerning
the availability and terms of routine legal services.").
38. Id. at 384.
39. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
40. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
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ents and the still-hospitalized Ms. McClintock, offering her legal advice
and doing some initial investigative work.' Upon receipt of Ms.
McClintock's contract for legal services, Mr. Ohralik proceeded to solicit
business from Wanda Lou Holbert, McClintock's passenger at the time
of the accident.42 Though initially somewhat receptive to the idea of a
lawsuit, Wanda Lou eventually decided not to pursue the claim. 3 Upon
conclusion of the underlying claims, both McClintock and Holbert filed
complaints with the county bar association which prosecuted Ohralik for
violation of the State's anti-solicitation rule.4" In its analysis the court
noted that, even post-Bates, space existed for states to regulate "com-
mercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a
component of that activity. '45 The Court expressed concern that "a law-
yer who engages in personal solicitation of clients may be inclined to
subordinate the best interests of the client to his own pecuniary inter-
ests, 46 and held that the Ohio State Bar Association could regulate an
attorney's in-person solicitation of clients without running afoul of the
First Amendment. 7 Interestingly, though dismissive of its analytical use-
fulness, the Court in its holding tipped its hat to the historical
underpinnings of the rule as being one of "professional etiquette" rather
than a "strictly ethical rule." 8 Perhaps this was the Court's subtle re-
minder that, despite the sweeping holding in Bates, it had not totally lost
touch with history.
In a companion case to Ohralik, captioned In re Primus, the Court
qualified its seemingly expansive endorsement of state regulation of at-
torney solicitation. The case involved one Edna Smith Primus, a civil
rights lawyer employed by the "Carolina Community Law Firm," but
who also contracted with the Columbia, South Carolina branch of the
American Civil Liberties Union.4 9 Ms. Primus volunteered to work with
the ACLU in representing mothers on public assistance in the state who
were forcibly sterilized as a precondition for receipt of public benefits.0
Ms. Primus conducted a general meeting in search of representative cli-
41. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449-50.
42. Id. at 451.
43. Id. at 452.
44. Id. 453-54. The rule in question, OHIO CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-
103(A) (1970), provided in part that: "[a] lawyer shall not recommend employment, as a pri-
vate practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has not sought his
advice regarding employment of a lawyer."
45. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456.
46. Id. at 461.
47. Id. at 468.
48. Id. at 460.
49. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 414 (1978).
50. Id. at 415-16.
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ents and eventually sent a letter to Mary Eta Williams offering her free
legal representation.' Ms. Williams opted not to retain the ACLU and,
based partially on Primus's letter to Williams, the Grievances Board for
the Supreme Court of South Carolina filed an action against Ms. Pri-
mus.9' The Supreme Court held that Primus's actions were protected by
the First Amendment and distinguished its holding in Ohralik in two
principle manners: First, it noted that Primus's solicitation of Williams
took the form of a letter, "not in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain.""
Second, the Court emphasized the underlying political motivations of
Primus and the ACLU which the Court saw as fundamentally different
than solicitation for the purpose of monetary reward." As such, the Su-
preme Court viewed the speech of Primus and the ACLU as falling
"within the generous zone of First Amendment protection reserved for
associational freedoms"55 and held that the First Amendment required
case-by-case analyses, rather than a broad prophylactic rule.56
The Supreme Court resumed its assault on advertising prohibitions
for lawyers in the case of In re R.M.J.57 The lawyer in the case, a member
of the Missouri bar, sent announcement cards to select addresses and
placed advertisements in the yellow pages and local newspapers publi-
cizing the opening of his office and listing both the jurisdictions in
which he practiced and his areas of specialization. 8 Several of these
methods of advertising violated a Missouri disciplinary rule which spe-
cifically delineated the words attorneys were allowed to use in
advertisements.59 Relying heavily on the fact that none of the lawyer's
advertisements appeared false or misleading, the Court found for the
attorney in question and held that "States may not place an absolute pro-
hibition on certain types of potentially misleading information, e.g., a
listing of areas of practice, if the information also may be presented in a
way that is not deceptive."60 However, the Court carefully limited the
scope of its holding noting that "[i]f experience proves that certain forms
of advertising are in fact misleading, although they did not appear at first
to be 'inherently' misleading, the Court must take such experience into
account.,
61
51. Id. at 416.
52. Id. at 417.
53. Id. at 422.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 431.
56. Id. at 437.
57. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
58. Id. at 196-97.
59. Id. at 194-95.
60. Id. at 203.
61. Id. at 201 n.l I (emphasis added).
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After four high-profile cases involving attorney advertising and so-
licitation, the Supreme Court had done its part to change the dialogue on
these issues and the ABA was forced to react. In 1983 the ABA adopted
its first major overhaul of attorney ethics rules when it published the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.62 In the wake of the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence on attorney advertising and solicitation, "[r]ather
than approaching lawyer advertising from a regulatory format, and des-
ignating that which could be contained in a publication, the Model Rules
chose to approach the matter more liberally, prohibiting only false or
misleading communications., 63 To this end, the ABA adopted Model
Rules 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3, which allowed non-misleading advertisements
but prohibited in-person solicitation of clients. 64 The Supreme Court had
finally forced the ABA to take a dramatic step away from its big firm
favoritism.
By the early 1980s the Supreme Court had compelled the ABA to
change its stance on some of the most significant issues in the area of
attorney advertising. As such, the Court turned to more narrow concerns.
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio61 the Court took up the case of a rather tactless Ohio attorney who
ran two newspaper ads which contained illustrations, including one of-
fering to represent women harmed by the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine
Device. 6 The Court held that the attorney's use of illustrations in his ad-
vertisements was constitutionally protected speech.67 In a piece of
analysis somewhat neglected by most commentators, the Court also up-
held Zauderer's right to dispense legal advice in his advertisements,
declaring that "It]he State is not entitled to interfere with that access [to
our system of justice] by denying its citizens accurate information about
their legal rights.
68
The Court next turned its attention to the use of direct mail adver-
tisements. In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n the Court rather easily
dispensed of concerns of overreaching by attorneys when it struck down
62. AM. BAR Ass'N, CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-2005 ix
(2006).
63. HILL, supra note 13, at 50.
64. ABA, supra note 62, at 894-98.
65. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626
(1985).
66. Id. at 630-31.
67. Id. at 642-43.
68. Id. at 643. The Court goes on to say that it need not rule on the "theoretical" ques-
tion of whether a state may make a prophylactic rule banning all legal advice in
advertisements. Id. at 644-45. However, the dicta quoted in this Note and the tenor of the
Court's analysis suggests it is extremely skeptical of such a prophylactic rule.
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Kentucky's broad-based ban on the use of direct mail.69 Interestingly, the
Supreme Court seemed to retreat from this holding seven years later in
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.70 In Went For It the Court encountered a
Florida rule which required personal injury Plaintiff's lawyers to wait 30
days before contacting an accident victim via direct mail solicitation.'
Significantly, this rule did not apply to defense lawyers and was promul-
gated by the State Bar of Florida, one of the most restrictive state bars in
the country in terms of lawyer advertising." Despite the Court's ruling in
Shapero, a new Court held that Florida's rule was constitutional. In her
analysis Justice O'Connor resurrected an old line of argumentation, pre-
senting harm to the reputation of the legal profession, rather than
potential for overreaching or deception by attorneys as a justification for
the disciplinary rule."
Though the Court has not taken up a case involving attorney adver-
tising in the last thirteen years, the ABA has not been so quiet. In 2002
the ABA made a small, but important change to its advertising rule,
MRPC 7.2. Striking its laundry list of permitted mediums in which at-
torneys can advertise, the ABA simplified its rule merely to read: "[A]
lawyer may advertise services through written, recorded or electronic
communication, including public media. ' 74 This was the first time the
ABA recognized electronic media in its ethics rules 5 Importantly, the
Committee also separated out "electronic communication" as deserving
of specific mention. Query whether the ABA chose to highlight such
communications so as to assure they were not overlooked or because the
Committee's underlying assumption was that electronic communications
(such as email) were not the same as other "written" or "recorded" forms
of communication. Specific notes regarding electronic communications
were also added to comments 3 and 5 to Rule 7.2.76 Furthermore, the
ABA added an amendment to Rule 7.3(a) prohibiting "real-time elec-
tronic contact" to solicit clients 7 Though these changes represent the
ABA's admirable awareness of the rapidly evolving nature of electronic
71
attorney advertising, Part III below reveals that many questions remain.
69. Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
70. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
71. Id. at 620-21
72. See id.
73. Id. at 624-28
74. ABA, supra note 62, at 720 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 722-23.
76. Id. at 721-22.
77. Id. at 752.
78. See also Louise L. Hill, Change is in the Air: Lawyer Advertising and the Internet,
36 U. RICH. L. REv. 21, 23-24 (2002) ("Generally speaking, the proposed revisions to the
Model Rules leave open a number of questions regarding what constitutes a misleading com-
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The purpose of this extensive historical review has been to demon-
strate both the proclivity of "establishment" attorneys to attempt to limit
advertising that is more likely to help the "small-time" lawyer and the
tendency of the Supreme Court to fight the ABA in its moves to con-
strain attorney advertising. From this perspective, regulation of attorney
advertising is better viewed as a realist power struggle rather than a bat-
tle over the moral center of the profession. This is important because, as
Part III below demonstrates, lawyer blawgs do not fit into neat boxes
easily labeled as "ideas," "free speech," "commercial speech," "advertis-
ing," or "solicitation." As such, an understanding of how the ABA and
the Supreme Court have framed these issues in the past likely will in-
form how they will react to the radical new medium of lawyer blawgs in
the future.
III. BLAWGS-A RADICAL NEW MEDIUM
A. Defining Blawgs
The "Internet revolution" continues to transform itself on an almost
daily basis. Enamored with the speed of information-gathering and
communication that the Internet now affords its users, "netizens" are
continually developing new ways to communicate with one another. Per-
haps one of the greatest recent inventions of the Internet community is
the web log or "blog." A blog is "nothing more than a web site that is
updated frequently and offers different mechanisms for reading the con-
tent other than a traditional web browser. The 'blogger' writes a short
article or blurb using blog software to 'post' the entry to a web site. 79
Stated more parochially, "a blog is a web site dedicated to the postings
of someone who may or may not have something to say. The word blog
is a contraction of 'web log.' A blawg is a blog dedicated to law-related
topics."8° Denise Howell, a lawyer and herself the author of a very
popular blawg, coined the word "blawg." 2 Attorneys blawg about a
munication. In addition, Ethics 2000 has declined to address whether lawyers may employ
devices that can be used to give a law firm's Web site priority placement during an Internet
search.").
79. David Gulbransen, Welcome to the Blawgosphere, 20 CBA REC. 36, 37 (Apr. 2006).
80. Lawrence M. Friedman, Knee Deep in the Blawg Bog, 19 CBA REC. 46, 46 (May
2005).
81. Denise Howell, Bag and Baggage, http://bgbg.blogspot.com (last visited Apr. 3,
2008).
82. Gulbransen, supra note 79, at 37.
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wide array of topics from discreet issues such as patent law 3 and real
estate law, " to broader issues such as the Supreme Court's docket85 or
law firm marketing8 6 Estimates as to the number of blawgs in existence
today vary wildly, although by one measure they exceed two thousand.87
Importantly, blawgs are a creature of the Internet-a rapidly evolving,
highly malleable, tremendously reputation-contingent publishing tool.
B. Blawgs as Advertising
The legal profession is known for many things, but being on the
"cutting edge" is not one of them. Lawyers are often characterized as
slow to adapt to new technology and methods. However, in the area of
blogging, lawyers are leading the charge. Perhaps one explanation for
this dynamic is the typical lawyer's constant need to network and market
himself. Some go so far as to call blawgs "the next great thing in legal
marketing. 8 The purpose of this section is to explore the truth of this
statement and also to outline the ways in which blawgs might function as
forms of advertising.
Experts present many arguments as to why blawgs may serve as ef-
fective marketing tools. One author summarizes the arguments in favor
of blogs thusly: First, blogs help lawyers hone their writing skills by
publishing blog entries on a regular schedule. Second, blogs help attor-
neys communicate with clients without speaking to each individually.
Third, blogs function as powerful online networks, marketing an attor-
ney's services to other practitioners in the field. 89 To this one might add
that a popular blawg brings to its author increased name recognition
and exposure in the legal world. Indeed, because blawgs are largely
unregulated and unreviewed, the currency of the blogosphere is reputa-
83. Dennis Crouch, Patently-O Patent Law Blog, http://www.patentlaw.typepad.com/
(last visited Apr. 3, 2008); Pierce Law Center, Pierce Law IP New Blog, http://
www.ipnewsblog.con (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).
84. Stephen E. Meltzer, Meltzer Law Offices, http://meltzer.blogs.com/meltzerlaw/ (last
visited Apr. 3, 2008); Michael H. Erdman, Real Estate, Real Competition & the Law,
http://rerclaw.blogspot.com/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2007); Robert H. Thomas, Inversecondem-
nation.com, http://www.inversecondemnation.com/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).
85. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP, SCOTUS Blog, http://
www.scotusblog.conwp/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).
86. Tom Kane, Legal Marketing Blog, http://www.legalmarketingblog.com/ (last visited
Apr. 3, 2008); Larry Bodine, LawMarketing Blog, http://blog.larrybodine.com/ (last visited
Apr. 3, 2008).
87. See Blawg.com, supra note 2.
88. Friedman, supra note 80, at 46.
89. Gulbransen, supra note 79, at 40.
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tion.9° Therefore, a popular blawg, almost by definition, is beneficial to
its author's professional reputation. 9'
Though the primary advertising tool utilized by blawgs is a reputa-
tional one, increasing the author's professional network, name
recognition and esteem within the profession, blawgs may employ
other advertising mechanisms as well. Most obviously, blawg writers
may put actual ads on their pages. These ads can take at least two
forms: the banner ad and the link (which can point to a law firm web
site or other formal entity). Therefore, while the "service" being of-
fered is the blawger's regular posts, the payoff for the author is, at least
in part, remunerative. Some suggest that blawgs are also effective mar-
keting tools because of the relative weight given to them by popular
search engines such as Google.92 Search engines employ complicated
algorithms which tend to reward devices such as blogs due to their
regularly updated content, specificity of subject area, and number of
links to outside sources. 93 In this view, blawgs are a powerful tool for
Internet attorney shoppers to find legal services.
Given all the marketing advantages which exist in blawgs, many
scholars as well as a fair share of state bars have called on lawyers (es-
pecially of the small firm or solo practitioner variety) to begin writing
94blawgs. They argue that blawgs are a cheap, easy, and effective way
for lawyers to increase their exposure and gain new clients. As one
pioneer of blawging opines,
Clients want to know what is in your head, what and how you
think about the legal issues that affect them, and, perhaps most
importantly, why you might be a useful counselor or persuasive
advocate. Blogs and related tools are perhaps the most power-
ful vehicles toward this end in your marketing arsenal.9
One scholar even trumpets the revolutionary potential of blawgs,
arguing that blawgs have the ability to break up traditional, oppressive
90. See Larry E. Ribstein, From Bricks to Pajamas: The Law and Economics of Ama-
teur Journalism, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 185, 212 (2006); Donald J. Kochan, The
Blogosphere and the New Pamphleteers, II NEXUS 99, 103 (2006).
91. See Penelope Trunk, Blogs 'Essential'to a Good Career, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 16,
2006, at G 1.
92. See Hill, supra note 78, at 40-41.
93. See id. at 39-40.
94. See, e.g., Steven A. Meyerowitz, Legal Tech 2006: Joining the Blog Boom, 28 PA.
LAW. 26 (2006); Toby Brown, Tune In and Blog On: New Marketing Technology for Lawyers,
53 R.I. BAR J. 19 (2005); Sarah Kellogg, Do You Blog?, 17 S.C. LAWYER 30(2005).
95. Denise M. Howell, Blog You, II NEXUS 69, 72-73 (2006).
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96hierarchies within the legal profession. These hierarchies, inciden-
tally, are the same hierarchies historically facilitated by rules of ethics,
as outlined in Part II above. Despite all the hype regarding the ability
of blawgs to garner clients for lawyers, evidence to date suggests that
this is a false hope. As one writer reports,
Almost everyone agrees that if blogging is a potential gold
mine when it comes to recruiting clients, then the vein of gold
has yet to be tapped. Though many bloggers hold out hope that
the Internet will generate new clients who feel comfortable at-
torney shopping on the Web, most of them have not seen it
reflected in their lists of new clients.97
C. The Problem of Categorizing Blawgs
Even if one concedes the unproven fact that blawgs function as ef-
fective marketing tools, it is too cynical to suggest that the sole
function of blawgs is marketing. Instead, blawgs fill a space in Ameri-
can media somewhere between formal legal publications, mainstream
journalism, and water cooler gossip. As one commentator notes:
A blog devoted to the law is not as informal as a juror's notes
taken during an ongoing trial, nor is it as formal as a law jour-
nal article. It is not as detached as a courthouse journalist's
stories should be (and sometimes are), and unlike a lawyer's
brief, it will not always be as committed to one side in a legal
controversy. Because it is in its early and formative years, the
legal blogosphere is not exactly sure what it is; it is defined
now by having no definition, each blog essentially self-
identifies. 98
Statements such as this demonstrate the difficulty in categorizing
blawgs. While many commentators, and even a few courts, have strug-
gled to characterize normal blogs for the purposes of the journalist's
96. Franklin G. Snyder, Late Night Thoughts on Blogging While Reading Duncan Ken-
nedy's Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy in an Arkansas Motel Room, II
NEXUS 111, 123 (2006).
97. Kellogg, supra note 94, at 35.
98. Lyle Denniston, Legal Blogs: The Searchfor Legitimacy, 11 NEXUS 17, 17 (2006).
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"privilege," 99 defamation law,' °° and even political campaign finance
laws, '°' legal blawgs present even more troubling questions. The nature
of legal blawgs spans the gambit of analysis, opinion, speculation, and
outright gossip. As such, defining the "space" within the marketplace of
ideas in which blawgs function is a difficult, if not impossible, task. This
section outlines the parameters of these "spaces" and the potential bene-
fits blawgs bring to them. In an attempt at even-handedness, this section
also outlines some ethical concerns potentially implicated by various
characterizations of blawgs.
The first substantive function blawgs serve is to inform the general
public about developments in the law in a manner that is approachable
and interesting. Fueled by the "information revolution" and the devel-
opment of the Internet, Americans are demanding more and more
knowledge about the world around them. Surely the legal arena has not,
and will not become immune to this condition, as clients demand greater
information about what is going on with their cases or what legal rights
they may have if they feel wronged. In this respect, lawyers are in a
unique position to provide a valuable service to the public by compre-
hensively reporting on cutting edge or "niche" topics not typically
covered by the mainstream media. '°2 Juxtaposed against this desire for
information are the very real barriers attorneys have self-interestedly
erected in order to keep out certain types of practitioners and their
99. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 981 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (C.J. Sentelle concurring) ("if we extend [the reporter's privilege] to the easily created
blog, or the ill-defined pamphleteer, have we defeated legitimate investigative ends of grand
juries in cases like the leak of intelligence involved in the present investigation?"); Randall D.
Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers, and Fourth Estate Inmates: The Misguided Pursuit of a Reporter's
Privilege, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 385, 432-37 (2006); Howard Fineman, Who is a
"Journalist"?, 4 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. I (2005); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism
and the Reporter's Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515 (2007); Nathan Fennessy, Comments,
Bringing Bloggers into the Journalistic Privilege Fold, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 1059 (2006); See
also Joseph S. Alonzo, Note, Restoring the Ideal Marketplace: How Recognizing Bloggers as
Journalists Can Save the Press, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 751 (2006); Laura Durity,
Note, Shielding Journalist-"Bloggers": The Need to Protect Newsgathering Despite the Dis-
tribution Medium, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. !1 (2006); Stephanie J. Frazee, Note,
Bloggers as Reporters: An Effect-Based Approach to First Amendment Protections in a New
Age of Information Dissemination, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 609 (2006); Note, Develop-
ments in the Law-The Law of Media: II. Protecting the New Media: Application of the
Journalist's Privilege to Bloggers, 120 HARv. L. REV. 996 (2007).
100. See, e.g., Melissa A. Troiano, Comment, The New Journalism? Why Traditional
Defamation Laws Should Apply to Internet Blogs, 55 AM. U.L. REV. 1447 (2006).
101. See, e.g., Shays v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 337 F Supp. 2d 28 (2004) (discussing
the efficacy of FEC rules excluding the "Internet" from campaign finance laws); Matthew
Fagan, Legal Update, The Federal Election Commission and Individual Internet Sites After
Shays and Meehan v. FEC, 12 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 159 (2006).
102. Howell, supra note 95, at 72.
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clients.' °3 Simply put, while clients and potential clients are demanding
more information today than ever before, their demands are not being
met by avenues of traditional legal scholarship and representation.
Blawgs offer a way for attorneys to fill this information gap." Not only
are blawgs a cheap, effective way to speak to clients en masse, but they
also help to inform those who feel wronged about their legal rights in an
understandable fashion. In this vein, blawgs reintroduce a sense of de-
mocracy to a justice system that often appears hierarchical and closed.
Though some blawgs unquestionably provide valuable information
to the general public, some may argue the relative worth of other speech
is suspect. In contrast to journalists and scholars who are subject to some
sort of standardized peer review, blawgers are free to opine and analyze
as they see fit, a freedom which may result in "knee-jerk commentary."'0 '
More pointedly, they are free to be wrong. While reputational checks on
blawgers ensure that no blawger can be wrong often and still maintain a
popular site,' °6 the fact remains that when someone publishes informa-
tion on the Internet, right or wrong, it remains in existence indefinitely.
This circumstance is coupled with a second problem; the weight mem-
bers of the general public attribute to the written or spoken word of an
attorney. What sets blawgers apart from other bloggers and mainstream
journalists is that when lawyers write, their words carry an added credi-
bility. °7 This added credibility has the dangerous potential to cause
consumers to approach attorney blawgs with a less critical eye than they
might other Internet sources, attributing to the blawg more weight than it
deserves. As such, a line drawing problem arises in which it is difficult
to determine the difference between legitimate (protected) speech, de-
ceptive speech, and advertising. In this light, some may argue, it is
unclear exactly how much deference should be given to blawgs.
The second function of blawgs is to inform other practitioners of
substantive developments in the law and to build relationships between
legal professionals. 0 Perhaps a secondary effect of this dynamic is to
103. See Fred S. McChesney, Commercial Speech in the Professions, The Supreme
Court's Unanswered Questions and Questionable Answers, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 91 (1985)
(explaining that advertising bans prevent the entry of new firms and less established lawyers
into the market, a phenomenon which sheds light on the reason why large firms have histori-
cally opposed rescinding advertising restrictions).
104. See Kochan, supra note 90, at 99 ("The blogosphere has become the new avenue for
individuals to 'spread the word' or spread ideas or opinions .... And for the past several years,
the blogosphere's scope-in production and consumption-has been increasing exponen-
tially.").
105. Kochan, supra note 90, at 103.
106. Kochan, supra note 90, at 103; Ribstein, supra note 90, at 192.
107. Kellogg, supra note 94, at 31-32.
108. See Kochan, supra note 90, at 102-03; Howell, supra note 95, at 70.
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generate scholarship through the free exchange of ideas online.' °9 Indeed,
some of the most well-known, effective blawgs to date are those run by
law professors and judges, people who have an incentive to promote
their work but lack a direct pecuniary interest."O Blawgs, when they op-
erate at a high level, are an incredible source of information and analysis
about legal topics. From explication of contract law to discussion of re-
cent Supreme Court opinions, this is exactly the sort of marketplace of
ideas our founders envisioned when they penned the First Amendment.
However, one could argue, even with blawgs that function mostly as
clearinghouses for information shared between legal professionals, the
potential for deception of the public remains. One can view Ohralik, and
to a lesser extent even Bates, as demonstrating the Supreme Court's con-
cern over the potential for attorney "overreach." Though the creation of
blawgs post-date the Court's ruling in Ohralik, the exchange of ideas in a
forum such as a blawg still implicates some of the same concerns. The
world of legal scholarship and information has always been a fairly
closed one, almost by design. As such, the Court could not have possibly
imagined in the 1970s a forum in which members of the general public
might "overhear" the legal musings of attorneys by viewing their ex-
changes of ideas. While it is true that members of the public must
actively seek out blawgs in order to obtain the knowledge that springs
from them, it is equally apparent that the potential for deception, or at
least confusion, of the general public is a possible concern.
The third primary function of blawgs is to entertain. Blawgs draw
their audience not only from their analysis of issues, subject area, or at-
tentiveness, but also from their readability. While people may turn to the
mainstream media for the "facts" of a recent legal event, or (optimisti-
cally) look to a treatise to find if their slip and fall is actionable, Blawgs
garner an audience by supplying this information in a useful, entertain-
ing manner.
Blawgs as a whole cannot be pigeonholed into any one of these
roles. In fact, most blawgs serve many of the above mentioned functions
simultaneously. Of course, for the purposes of ethics regulations and first
amendment analysis, it would be much easier if one could attribute to
any given blawg a particular role (i.e. "this blawg appears to be only
about advertising," or "this blawg offers a strict analysis of the law of
contracts in the state of Florida"). Unfortunately, blawging as a medium
does not allow one to draw such neat distinctions. Furthermore, even if
109. Alfred L. Brophy, Response, Law [Review]'s Empire: The Assessment of Law Re-
views and Trends in Legal Scholarship, 39 CONN. L. REV. 101, 106-07 (2006); Cass R.
Sunstein and Randy E. Barnett, Constitutive Commitments and Roosevelt's Second Bill of
Rights: A Dialogue, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 205, 224 (2005).
110. Ribstein, supra note 90, at 196-97.
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one were able to intelligently categorize blawgs, the preceding discus-
sion demonstrates that conclusions as to the ethics of blawgs as a
medium would still be far from clear. As such, scholars should be loath
to create a per se category for blawgs in the blind hope that such a heu-
ristic will help to create bright line rules for regulating the conduct of
blawgs.
D. The Concerns of Legal Ethics Experts
Given the inability of courts, ethicists, and this author to definitively
categorize the role of blawgs in the spectrum of advertising, journalism,
gossip, and scholarship, perhaps a more effective analytical tool is to
explore why ethicists might be concerned about blawgs in the first place.
Generally speaking, legal ethics experts point to three potential concerns
with respect to blawgs: their relationship to advertising rules, the poten-
tial for direct solicitation problems, and unauthorized practice of law
issues. This portion of the Note discusses each of these concerns in turn.
The first issue is the one most comprehensively covered by this
Note: a concern over blawgs' role as tools for advertising. From this per-
spective, ethicists argue that blawgs have the potential to be deceptive,
inaccurate, or both."' As mentioned at length in Part III.B above, lawyers
use blawgs as tools for advertising in at least three ways. First, lawyers
use blawgs to build up their reputation in the community and within the
profession."2 Second, authors include in their blawgs links to law firms,
legal services providers, or other law blawgs which effectively function
as advertisements. 113 Third, writers place banner ads on their web sites
which promote various legal services providers." 4 These ethical concerns
will be analyzed in Part III.E below.
The second concern some ethicists point to is the potential for im-
permissible direct solicitation to take place via blawgs. In their recent
amendments to Model Rules 7.2 and 7.3, the ABA recognized the poten-
tial ethical concerns of Internet-based communications. ' 5 In so doing,
the ABA noted that, while email does not implicate concerns of attorney
overreach, direct real-time chats online are more suspicious."16 While the
Ill. See Troiano, supra note 100, at 1474-75 (arguing that bloggers should be subject to
traditional defamation analysis because bloggers "purport to have trustworthy information"
but do not always live up to that standard); Meyerowitz, supra note 94, at 28 (discussing the
potential for lapses in quality with regard to information posted on a blog, given the informal
nature of the medium); see also supra Part III.C.
112. See Ribstein, supra note 90, at 212; Kochan, supra note 90, at 103.
113. Ribstein, supra note 90, at 196.
114. See id.
115. ABA, supra note 62, at 720.
116. See Hill, supra note 78, at 33.
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ABA did not explicitly create regulations for blawgs, scholars have used
the ABA's implicit logic to express concern about the common blawg
practice of allowing users to "comment" on blawg entries."7 The "com-
ment" feature allows users to post (sometimes anonymously, sometimes
not) their reactions to the blawger's various entries." 8 Generally, the web
site's author posts his "story" to the "home" page of the site while com-
mentators post their reactions to a second-order page linked to the blawg
entry itself. In these comment "threads" users are free to interact with
each other and the blawger, a situation which often stimulates interesting
discussion."9 Some may argue that this sort of dialogue is similar to that
of a real-time conversation and ought to be regulated.'2 However, given
the lack of real-time communication in blawg comment features, the bet-
ter analogy is to the back and forth of normal, everyday "snail mail" for
which the ABA has expressed little alarm. Having outlined the concern,
a full analysis of the issues will, again, be delayed until the next portion
of this Note.
The third, and final, major concern many express regarding blawgs
is the potential for unauthorized practice of law. According to Model
Rule 5.5, "[a] lawyer shall not: (a) practice law in a jurisdiction where
doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdic-
,,121tion. In the context of blawgs, one can easily see the potential
problem. The Internet is a "shotgun" approach to communication. It is
impossible for a blawger to precisely target where any given person will
read their entries. As such, a lawyer in Iowa may find himself unwit-
tingly giving advice about contract terms to a reader in North Carolina, a
state in which the Iowa lawyer is not licensed to practice law. A full dis-
cussion of this thorny issue also merits more careful explication below.
117. Ribstein, supra note 90, at 204 ("Web-only distribution enables blogs to be interac-
tive with their readers through the comment and trackback features. Each entry can therefore
generate a surrounding body of correcting and extending commentary and references."); see
also David Bruns, Blogs: The Great Equalizer in Marketing Attorney Expertise, 2005 SAN
FRANCISCO ATT'y 46, 47 (calling the interaction between bloggers and those that comment on
a blog an "active dialogue.").
118. See Dave Winer, Weblogs at Harvard Law-What Makes a Weblog a Weblog?
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/whatMakesAWeblogAWeblog (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).
119. Bruns, supra note 117, at 47; See also Winer, supra note 118 (outlining the me-
chanics of blog comment features); Sunstein & Barnett, supra note 109, at 224 (demonstrating
the type of scholarly dialogue that can occur via a blog).
120. Cf Mitchel L. Winick et al., Attorney Advertising on the Internet: From Arizona to
Texas-Regulating Speech on the Cyber-Frontier, 27 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 1487, 1572 (1996)
(expressing concern that email exchanges may give rise to solicitation concerns and, therefore,
might be open to regulation).
121. STEPHEN GILLERS & Roy D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
STANDARDS 314 (2000).
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E. Some Synthesis: The Intersection of Blawgs,
Ethics Rules, and the First Amendment
This Note suggests that blawgs serve more than a simple advertising
function, and that blawging may implicate serious potential ethical con-
cerns for attorneys. But if one cannot define the role of blawgs, then how
can one say with any precision what sorts of protections blawgs have
under the First Amendment or what sorts of burdens they must adhere to
under ethics rules? From the perspective of the Model Code of Profes-
sional Conduct and current Supreme Court jurisprudence, should blawgs
be subjected to some sort of regulation? Historically speaking, the an-
swer to this question has been no, almost by default. As one prolific
blawger notes, "[b]logs are way out ahead of where the ethics rules
are."''22 However, the current regulatory status of blawgs does not answer
the normative question as to whether blawgs ought to be subject to regu-
lation as a matter of legal ethics (the public policy of this decision is
investigated in Part IV below). Scholars, blawgers, and even some state
bar associations suggest the answer to the normative question is also a
resounding no.121
Over the last roughly one hundred years, the American Bar Associa-
tion and the United States Supreme Court has crafted policies which
regulate the ability of attorneys to advertise based on two underlying
principles: to increase the regard the general public has toward lawyers
and limit the potential for overreach or deception in attorney advertising.
The former principle took root in 1908, as exemplified by Canon 27, and
held sway for roughly seventy years.' 24 In 1977, the Supreme Court in
Bates rejected the need for ethical codes which promote the general
reputation of the profession and instead expressed a more limited con-
. 25
cern about deception in attorney advertising. The Court spent the next
122. Kellogg, supra note 94, at 38.
123. See generally Barry L. Brickner, Focus on Professional Responsibility: Scary
Things (or How to Avoid Breaching Ethics on the Internet), 78 MICH B. J. 578, 579 (1999)
("Posted information is in the nature of general material, non-targeted, and is seen or used
when a user gains access to the venue upon which the information is posted. Since the user
initiates the contact with the posted information, MRPC 7.3 is not triggered."); Bernadette
Miragliotta, First Amendment: The Special Treatment of Legal Advertising, 1990 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 597, 627-32 (1992); Ribstein, supra note 90.
124. ABA, supra note 62, at 894-98.
125. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977) ("[W]e find the postulated
connection between advertising and the erosion of true professionalism to be severely
strained"); Bates, 433 U.S. at 369 ("[T]he assertion that advertising will diminish the attor-
ney's reputation in the community is open to question."); Bates, 433 U.S. at 375 n.31
("Unethical lawyers and dishonest laymen are likely to meet even though restrictions on ad-
vertising exist. The appropriate response to fraud is a sanction addressed to that problem
alone, not a sanction that unduly burdens a legitimate activity."); Bates, 433 U.S. at 383 (find-
ing that regulation to encourage truthfulness will not discourage protected speech).
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18 years defining the boundaries between permissible advertising based
speech and impermissibly deceptive speech. Interestingly, in 1995, with
a largely new Court in place, Justice O'Connor resurrected the "reputa-
tion of the profession" justification in her defense of a Florida ethics rule
which prohibited direct-to-consumer mailings within 30 days of an event
during which a potential client was injured. ' 26 Though Went For It is
merely one opinion by a Justice no longer even on the bench, it repre-
sents a significant shift in the analytical process of the Court.'27 If the
Court continues to use professional reputation arguments in future cases,
one could rightly expect a shift toward Court support for far more strin-
gent ethics rules.' 8 On the other hand, if Went For It is merely an
analytical aberration, one could expect that advertising ethics rules will
continue to play a rather limited role.'
29
Given the Court's recent vacillation on its underlying principles for
analyzing regulations on professional advertising, one must wonder what
the mood of the Court is today. However, analytically, it is difficult to
envision a scenario in which the ABA, the various state bars, and the
Court could support the comprehensive regulation of attorney blawgs in
any principled manner under either major theory advanced by the Court
over the history of its advertising jurisprudence. Even if one concedes
that support for some level of regulation may exist in the Court's holding
in Went For It (due to its shift toward the professional reputation con-
cerns of the early 20th century), scant evidence exists to suggest that
blawgs, generally speaking, damage the reputation of the profession. In
fact, as previously noted, the currency of blawgs is reputation.' 30 Indeed,
the importance of reputation within one's physical community has be-
come less important in the "real world" than in years past,'3 ' yet one of
126. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625 (1995) ("We have little trouble cred-
iting the Bar's interest as substantial. On various occasions we have accepted the proposition
that 'States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries
... '") (emphasis added). Interestingly, in supporting her assertion that the Court has "little
trouble" upholding a State's interest in protecting the reputation of professions within their
borders, Justice O'Connor cites Ohralik as well as two decisions which were handed down
before Bates. To ignore the Court's shift toward a more narrow deception-based concern in
Bates can only be seen as a move, on the part of Justice O'Connor, to repudiate the underlying
rationale of Bates and its progeny. Simply put, Justice O'Connor seems to want every prece-
dent cited in Part II to go away.
127. Winick, supra note 120, at 1527.
128. Id.
129. Id. (observing that "[i]n view of these shifts in the Court's makeup and perspective,
it would be difficult to predict the outcome of any future attorney advertising cases heard
before the Supreme Court.").
130. See Ribstein, supra note 90; Kochan, supra note 90.
131. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 374 n.30 (1977) ("It might be argued that
advertising is undesirable because it allows the potential client to substitute advertising for
reputational information in selecting an appropriate attorney.... Although the system may
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the principle goals of a blawg is to incubate a positive reputation for its
author in the legal industry as a whole.'32 Far from imposing on passive
viewers an impression of "ambulance chasing" attorneys, blawgs are
specifically sought out by consumers of legal services to learn more
about a particular area of the law. People have to want to read a blawg
and lawyers have to make informative and interesting posts if they want
readers to notice them. From this perspective, it is difficult to envision
how one might argue blawgs harm the reputation of the profession, short
of the minority of blawgs which are poorly written.
Ironically, though application of the Court's principles concerning
attorney overreach in Bates has usually meant the death knell for adver-
tising restrictions, one could argue that there is still some analytical
space in which to regulate blawgs. As noted in Part II above, the Court
held in Bates that attorney advertisements constitute commercial speech
which must be allowed under the First Amendment, though the Court
found such speech deserves less protection than other types of speech
(such as politically motivated statements).'33 Indeed, the Court in In re
R.M.J. went on to say that even if a type of speech is potentially mislead-
ing, it cannot be prohibited unless it is actually misleading.'
3 4
Furthermore, the Court hinted at First Amendment protections for attor-
ney advertisements which inform citizens of their legal rights.'35 While
these cases indicate a wide degree of deference to attorney advertise-
ments under the Bates "misleading" or "deceptive" line of analysis, the
Court has intimated that it will restrain attorney advertising if it goes too
far. In dicta in Ohralik, a case normally cited for its language on in-
person solicitation by attorneys, the Court indicated a willingness to al-
low the regulation of "harmful commercial activity."'36 Furthermore, the
Court qualified its broad holding in In re R.M.J. stating, "[i]f experience
proves that certain forms of advertising are in fact misleading, although
they did not appear at first to be 'inherently' misleading, the Court must
take such experience into account."' 3 7 As such, the Court has crafted a
have worked when the typical lawyer practiced in a small, homogenous community in which
ascertaining reputational information was easy for a consumer, commentators have seriously
questioned its current efficacy.") (citations omitted).
132. See Ribstein, supra note 90, at 192 (suggesting that, to be successful, blawgers
must build up credibility which, in turn, allows them to test their skills and marketability).
133. Bates, 433 U.S. at 379, 383-84.
134. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
135. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
643 (1985) (holding that the State is not entitled to prejudge the merits of its citizens' claims
by choking off access to information that might be useful to its citizens in deciding whether to
press those claims in court).
136. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,456 (1978).
137. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 200 n. I1 (emphasis added).
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doctrine with a heavy presumption against regulation of attorney adver-
tising practices unless those practices are found to be egregiously
misleading or harmful.
The resulting question is whether the potential for abuse in the
blawgosphere is substantial enough to trump the First Amendment pro-
tections applied to attorney advertisements by the Supreme Court via
Bates and its progeny. As noted in Parts III.B-D above, potential for
abuse of the blawg medium certainly exists. However, blawgs deserve
substantial First Amendment protection under the Bates line of cases for
three reasons. First, it is untenable to argue that blawgs, even in their
most abhorrent, self-promoting form, serve only an advertising function.
Blawgs by nature contain valuable information which set them apart
from normal advertisements, and even the most profit-oriented blawgs
serve some non-remunerative, socially beneficial role which ought to be
protected by the First Amendment under the Bates line of cases. The
presumption against chilling this sort of speech is simply too high. Sec-
ond, the "ethic" of the blawgosphere itself creates a check on deceptive,
overreaching activity such that almost no blawg could reach the level of
egregiousness sufficient to overcome the First Amendment's presump-
tion against regulation and still remain in existence for any substantial
period of time. The blawgosphere is a world powered by reputation, and
blawgers read each other's material. There is no better critic for blawgs
than others who publish in the same medium. Blawgers tend to be
fiercely defensive of their medium and will attack a deceptive or consis-
tently inaccurate blawg. Though blawgs do not have editors or peer
reviewers, they do have informed, active audiences who are willing to
make their opinions known. This free-market driven test on blawg con-
tent is a better check on blawger ethics than any rule the ABA or the
various state bars could possibly draft. Third, blawgs are evolving too
fast for regulators to keep up. Even if the Court were to permit the regu-
lation of blawgs as an inherently deceptive form of advertising, it is
unclear how the ABA or the states could rein them in without heavy
handedly quashing the independent spirit that is the hallmark of blaw-
ging today.
The analysis of the interaction between blawgs and anti-solicitation
rules is considerably less complicated than with standard advertising. In
Ohralik and In re Primus, cases argued and handed down on the same
day, the court expressed a concern for the potential of attorneys to "over-
reach" through direct consumer solicitation. In particular, the Court
worried, "[t]he aim and effect of in-person solicitation may be to provide
a one-sided presentation and to encourage speedy and perhaps unin-
formed decision-making; there is no opportunity for intervention or
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counter-education by agencies of the Bar, supervisory authorities, or per-
sons close to the solicited individual.""'3 These concerns are not present
with blawgs for two reasons. First, blawg readers seek out the informa-
tion rather than have it forced upon them.'39 In this respect, those that
engage in a dialogue via a blawg are in precisely the opposite disposition
as those the Court worried about in Ohralik. Far from "uninformed" de-
cision makers, these are people who rationally seek information via
Internet blawgs. 4 0 As such, one might speculate that these same people
turn to several blawgs and other sources of information before making a
decision about their legal representation. This is precisely the sort of "in-
tervention or counter-education" the Court envisioned legal consumers
would not take when directly solicited.
Second, comment features in blawgs allow time for self-reflection.
Unlike real time telephone or in-person communications, blawgs afford
users the opportunity to comment or not to comment on a blawg post.
Should a user decide to comment, the resulting dialogue is more akin to
an exchange of letters as in In re Primus as opposed to impermissible
real-time communication as in Ohralik. This is because blawg comment
features do not generate instantaneous exchanges of dialogue. Instead,
substantial delay is inherent in the system as users publish comments to
the website and create a "string" of dialogue rather than a real-time dis-
course. As such, no real power dynamic or unequal bargaining position
exists between the blawger and any person posting comments. As the
consumer does not engage in a one-to-one conversation, he or she is free
to converse with a blawger or not. Furthermore, many, if not most,
blawgs allow users to post comments anonymously, creating a truly free
exchange of ideas while nullifying any sense of compulsion on the part
of the consumer. Given these dynamics, it is unlikely the Supreme Court
would find any impermissible solicitation present in attorney blawgs.
The final major ethical issue implicated in blawging is the potential
for unauthorized practice of law violations. Here, again, there is a prob-
lem of categorization. If the Court were to interpret blawgs as
commercial speech, then unauthorized practice of law issues may be im-
plicated given the universal reach of the Internet and state bar rules
138. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457.
139. See Brickner, supra note 123, at 579 ("Posted information is in the nature of gen-
eral material, non-targeted, and is seen or used when a user gains access to the venue upon
which the information is posted. Since the user initiates the contact with the posted informa-
tion, MRPC 7.3 is not triggered.").
140. See Amy Busa and Carl G. Sussman, Expanding the Market for Justice: Arguments
for Extending In-Person Client Solicitation, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 487, 508 (1999)
("The more actively involved clients are in the litigation process, and in the selection of an
attorney, the more likely they are to achieve positive results.").
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governing the practice of law in each of the 50 states.' 4' However, if the
Court were to interpret blawgs merely as political speech or commen-
tary, then they would enjoy the full protection of the First Amendment
and would not be subject to unauthorized practice of law limitations.'
42
The Court has not made its perspective on this issue known, and it is be-
yond the scope of this Note to speculate further in this regard. However,
this legal uncertainty can be easily solved using a tool already adopted
by a significant number of popular blawgs-disclaimers.
F. Disclaimers-A Potential "Solution" to a Non-Existent Problem
While this Note suggests blawgers are not required to follow any ad-
vertising-based rules of ethics, blawgers could avoid some ethical issues
implicated in the practice of blawging by placing a link to a standard
disclaimer on the main page of their blawgs. Indeed, many popular
blawgs and law firm websites already follow this practice. As one com-
mentator asserts, "almost every lawyer blog has a disclaimer."'
43
Furthermore, the placement of a disclaimer on a blawg is both quick and
easy for an attorney.
The purpose of a disclaimer for an attorney blawg is twofold. First, a
disclaimer quashes any potential ethical issues implicated by the blawg.
As noted above, ethics in the blawgosphere is somewhat of an unknown
universe. Though this Note argues that the ethics issues involved are not
particularly great, an attorney cannot know with certainty what the ABA
and the Supreme Court will decide to do about blawgs. Second, a dis-
claimer insulates an attorney from potential malpractice liability. As one
commentator astutely points out, "[o]ne evolving issue is whether a law-
yer who offers information on the Internet is 'giving legal advice,'
thereby subjecting himself to malpractice claims, the attorney-client
privilege, and confidentiality. The Internet provides fertile ground for
unwittingly creating an attorney-client relationship."'44 Though this au-
thor can find no instance of any malpractice lawsuits or ethics violations
filed against blawgers as a result of their posts, some evidence suggests
that consumers of legal services do give credibility to blawgs.'4 5 Neither
141. Kellogg, supra note 94, at 38; Nia Marie Monroe, Current Developments 2004-
2005, The Need for Uniformity: Fifty Separate Voices Lead to Disunion in Attorney Internet
Advertising, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1005, 1016-19 (2005).
142. See generally Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 458.
143. Kellogg, supra note 94, at 38.
144. Jeffrey E. Kirkey, Legal Ethics in Cyberspace: Keeping Lawyers and Their Com-
puters Out of Trouble, 18 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 37, 47 (2001).
145. See generally Gross v. U.S., No. 05-1818, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68965 (D.D.C.
2006) (in which the court speculates that this pro se litigation was possibly inspired by a blog
posting); Kellogg, supra note 94, at 31-32 (stating that consumers tend to give greater weight
to the words of lawyers).
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the courts nor the ABA have given any explicit guidance as to whether a
disclaimer would be an effective way to resolve the potential ethical and
malpractice issues which arise in the blawgosphere. 4 6 However, in Bates
the Court averred that a disclaimer may be an effective way to alleviate
ethics-based concerns about attorney advertising in general.'47 On the
whole, it seems likely that the conscientious act of placing a disclaimer
on a blawg would militate against any underlying ethics issues the
Model Code attempts to address.'4 8 Furthermore, disclaimers have long
been utilized on law firm web sites,4 9 which lends credence to the argu-
ment that such disclaimers are both effective and familiar to the
consumer.
Several general models for a blawg disclaimer exist which may help
attorneys avoid malpractice and ethics-based issues. Though the specific
language may differ, the disclaimers various law firm websites and at-
torney blawgs utilize all have certain elements in common. First, they
indicate that the blawg is not intended to offer "legal advice" and that the
information provided on the blawg may not necessarily be accurate.
Second, they indicate that the blawg does not in any way create an attor-
ney-client relationship.'5 ' Third, they indicate that the author is only
licensed to practice in a specific state or jurisdiction and that the blawg is
not intended to attract or advise clients outside that jurisdiction.'5 2
Fourth, they indicate that any link provided to another website does not
constitute a referral or endorsement.'
53
As noted earlier, there is no way of knowing whether a disclaimer
will help shield a blawger from malpractice liability or ethics violations.
However the use of such a device is highly encouraged not only by this
author, but by other scholars and commentators as well.' 54 Including a
disclaimer on one's blawg is cheap, easy, and smart. Until such a dis-
146. Kirkey, supra note 144, at 48; Kellogg, supra note 97, at 38.
147. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) ("We do not foreclose the
possibility that some limited supplementation, by way of warning or disclaimer or the like,
might be required of even an advertisement of the kind ruled upon today so as to assure that
the consumer is not misled.").
148. See Hill, supra note 78, at 25-26 ("Additionally, the comments [to the Model Rules
amended in 2001] indicate that using disclaimers may make it less likely that a statement
about a lawyer or the lawyer's services will be construed as misleading.").
149. David Hricik, The Speed of Normal: Conflicts, Competency, and Confidentiality in
the DigitalAge, 10 CoMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 73, 76 (2005).
150. Meyerowitz, supra note 94, at 29.
151. Bruns, supra note 117, at 47.
152. See Kellogg, supra note 94, at 38; Kirkey, supra note 144, at 48-49.
153. Jeffrey R. Kruester, Attorney Sites Can Avoid Violations of Ethics Rules, NAT't L.J.,
Aug. 12, 1996, at B 11.
154. Hill, supra note 78, at 25-26; Meyerowitz, supra note 94, at 29; Kellogg, supra
note 94, at 38.
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claimer is tested in court, a blawger would be unwise to tread into the
murky waters of the blawgosphere without one.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY ON A SHOESTRING
Even if the Supreme Court granted the states and the ABA the ability
to regulate attorney blawgs, some basic public policy analysis suggests
regulators should continue to leave blawgs to their own devices. The
blogosphere itself, and the Internet more generally, are characterized by
a certain freedom. One of the greatest attributes of the medium is its low
entry and maintenance costs. Any lawyer may publish a blawg on any
topic that strikes their fancy. Regulation of blawgs would militate against
this ethos, possibly driving potential blawgers from the market or pre-
venting others from entering. One commentator succinctly opines that,
"[i]f [blogs] are placed, voluntarily or involuntarily, under norms of 'pro-
fessional' conduct, ethics, law or credentialing, then they may cease to
be what they have been, and perhaps what they ought to remain."'5 5 Yet
another scholar makes a direct appeal to the ethos of blawgers arguing,
The impulses that cause someone to value freedom of expression
enough to publish to a small audience without direct compensa-
tion are also likely to make these writers resist external
constraints. Bloggers' diversity and unruliness could make them
especially resistant to efforts to impose norms through law that
they have not otherwise internalized.
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Indeed, if the reactions of political bloggers to the Federal Election
Commission's attempts to regulate them are any indication,' 7 erstwhile
regulators of legal blawgs will face severe opposition to any comprehen-
sive attempt at regulation. To the extent that regulations on blawgs did
shrink the "industry" and prevent entry of new blawgers, the free market
based reputational checks on the quality of legal blawgs that assume
such prominence in this Note will be hampered.' 58 Further, consumers
will lose out on the legitimate information, news, and entertainment that
these blawgs offer.
59
155. Denniston, supra note 98, at 18.
156. Ribstein, supra note 90, at 213.
157. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Loophole a Spigot for E-mail; Critics Fear Voters Will be
Deluged as Fall Elections Near, WASH. POST, June 11, 2006, at A06; John Reinan, Bloggers
Push Politics Aside in Fight Against FEC, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, Mar. 20, 2006, at I A.
158. See Ribstein, supra note 90, at 212-13, 236-37.
159. See Ribstein, supra note 90, at 188 ("Moreover, any benefits of regulation must be
balanced against the cost of over deterring speech by bloggers, who usually have weaker in-
centives to speak than career journalists. Regulation may sharply reduce amateur journalism's
Spring 20081
484 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 14:2:457
Even if a state or the ABA were to decide to regulate attorney
blawgs, it is far from obvious exactly how the potential regulator might
go about doing so. The Internet is, by nature, a rapidly evolving technol-
ogy that does not lend itself to hard and fast rules. '60 Furthermore, the
Internet is not a medium that easily submits to the will of individual ju-
risdictions. "Individual states cannot easily impose their will on this
international medium .... [T]he legal system may be unable to devise a
coherent set of rules that would have the effect of establishing Internet
norms."' 6 ' A potential regulator would be forced to answer certain unan-
swerable questions in order to effectively enforce any potential
regulation: where is a blawg located? What constitutes "legal advice", an
"advertisement", or mere "speech"? Should lawyers be regulated more
than law professors? What constitutes a "misleading" statement in the
context of a blawg? The questions are virtually endless and the answers
difficult, if not impossible, to provide. As scholars across the spectrum of
Internet law are beginning to discover, this is not an easily regulated me-
dium.
V. BLAWGS As AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ALL ATTORNEY
ADVERTISING RESTRICTIONS
Given the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on attorney advertising
over the last thirty years, the proverbial "elephant in the room" is the
threshold consideration of whether any ethics-based restrictions on at-
torney advertising are justified. Indeed, the Court itself questioned the
historical roots of advertising restrictions when, in rejecting the need to
defend the "professionalism" of lawyers, the Court noted that "[iut ap-
pears that the ban on advertising originated as a rule of etiquette and not
as a rule of ethics. ... Since the belief that lawyers are somehow 'above'
trade has become an anachronism, the historical foundation for the ad-
vertising restraint has crumbled.' ' '62 Taking a cue from the Supreme
Court, many scholars have questioned the need for advertising restric-
tions on attorneys.' 63 The literature advances essentially two primary
comparative advantage over professional journalism in allowing the expression of diverse
views and the dissemination of specialized information.").
160. Winick, supra note 127, at 1579 ("[T]he Internet, and particularly attorney use of
the Internet, may be changing too rapidly to regulate.").
161. Ribstein, supra note 90, at 213.
162. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 371-72 (1977); See also DRINKER, supra
note 6, at 40-41.
163. See, e.g., Leonard E. Gross, The Public Hates Lawyers: Why Should We Care?, 29
SETON HALL L. REV. 1405, 1430-39 (1999); Marc David Lawlor, Note, Ivory Tower Paternal-
isin and Lawyer Advertising: The Case of Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 40 ST. Louis L.J.
895 (1996).
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arguments against advertising restrictions: first, the Supreme Court
should, as a public policy matter, extend First Amendment protections to
all attorney advertising that is not "false or misleading" as further restric-
tions decrease consumer access to legitimate information and increase
the cost of legal services, thereby harming both poorer consumers and
newer or "small-time" lawyers.'64 Second, restrictions on attorney adver-
tising discriminate against attorneys in a way that is impermissible in
almost any other context.' 65 From this perspective, it makes little logical
or constitutional sense to allow someone the full breadth of First
Amendment speech protections only until they pass a state bar exam.'66
While it is beyond the scope of this Note to give this topic full treatment,
it is important to consider how this debate interacts with the blawg phe-
nomenon.
The blawg medium has exposed restrictions on attorney advertising
for what they really are; not an attempt to uphold the fundamental ethics
of the profession, but rather a naked power grab by wealthy, entrenched
interests. This power grab was, in the past, disguised by the fact that it
was expensive for attorneys to advertise. Therefore, when attorneys had
the budget to advertise, such moves tended to take the form of heavy-
handed "ambulance chaser" advertisements, rather than informative
"rights based" advertising that could be characterized as political
164. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Why Lawyers Should be Allowed to Advertise: A
Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, 1107-09 (1983) (arguing that
lifting restrictions on attorney advertising will decrease the cost of certain standard legal ser-
vices); Leading Cases, 109 HARV. L. REV. I11, 198-99 (1995) (arguing that advertising
restrictions harm consumers and lawyers with smaller practices); Dorothy Virginia Kibler,
Note, Commercial Speech and Disciplinary Rules Preventing Attorney Advertising and Solici-
tation: Consumer Loses with the Zauderer Decision, 65 N.C. L. REV. 170, 192 (1986) ("The
simple solution to these problems, and by far the best solution, is to allow attorneys to use any
type or method of advertisement that contains information which is not false, fraudulent, de-
ceptive, or misleading."); Daniel L. Zelenko, Note, Do You Need a Lawyer? You May Have to
Wait 30 Days: The Supreme Court Went Too Far in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 45 AM. U.
L. REV. 1215, 1238-42 (1996) (arguing that decisions such as Went For It will reintroduce the
negative effects of advertising bans that existed before Bates into the legal market).
165. See Rodney A. Smolla, The Puffery of Lawyers, 36 U. RIcH. L. REV. 1 (2002) (out-
lining ways in which restrictions on attorney advertising differ from restrictions, or lack
thereof, on other forms of advertising by non-attorneys and arguing that such differences make
little sense).
166. See Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for
the Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEx. L. REV. 777, 780 (1993) (question-
ing the need for any type of restriction on commercial speech the author notes that "[t]he
theoretical question should not be what qualifies commercial speech for First Amendment
coverage, but what, if anything, disqualifies it. In my view, there are no convincing arguments
for disqualifying most modern advertising from constitutional protection.") (emphasis in
original).
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speech."' However, the blawg-world demonstrates that the combination
of political and commercial speech in advertisements is both function-
ally possible and beneficial to consumers.' r An open discussion of the
rights of legal consumers around the country, such as the one facilitated
by blawgs, strikes at the core of the Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence.'6 9 As such, attempts to regulate blawgs evince deeper
problems than trying to fit the square peg of blawgs into the round hole
of advertising restrictions. The core motivation of erstwhile regulators is
revealed to be a desire to close out "small-time" lawyers while promot-
ing the profit motive of large law firms.
70
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note suggests that, under current ethics rules and Supreme
Court jurisprudence, blawgs are likely not subject to regulation and, even
if they were, it would not be in the best interest of states or the ABA to
force the blawgosphere to submit to regulation. On one level, the unique
nature of the Internet and blogs themselves makes it difficult to contort
the Supreme Court's logic into a form that can be seen to sensibly allow
for the regulation of blawgs. This Note demonstrates an awareness of the
very real ethical issues which blawgs may create as the medium contin-
167. Kenneth Lasson, Lawyering Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Fees and Justice, 74
B.U. L. REV. 723, 741 (1994) (describing some of the more egregious advertising practices of
some attorneys).
168. See supra Part III; see also Christopher R. Lavoie, Note, Have You Been Injured in
an Accident? The Problem of Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
413, 436 (1997) (arguing that all truthful information is beneficial to the public and, as a re-
sult, commercial speech should not be regulated); Brian J. Waters, Comment, A Doctrine in
Disarray: Why the First Amendment Demands the Abandonment of the Central Hudson Test
for Commercial Speech, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1626, 1645-46 (1997) (arguing that even
purely commercial speech provides consumers with essential information).
169. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 643 (1985) ("the State is not entitled to prejudge the merits of its citizens' claims by
choking off access to information that might be useful to its citizens in deciding whether to
press those claims in court"); Susan Alice Moore, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.: Refining the
Constitutional Standard For Evaluating State Restrictions on Legal Advertising, 45 CATH. U.
L. REV. 1351, 1397 (1996) (arguing that consumer access to the free flow of commercial in-
formation is a "fundamental principle" of the First Amendment); But see Frederick Schauer,
The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L. REV. 687, 702 (1997) (arguing that the
question of whether or not to subject attorney advertising to First Amendment analysis
"should not be distorted by the fact that attorney advertising involves speech, or communica-
tion, or the conveying of information. These characterizations apply equally well to a vast
array of human activity to which the First Amendment has (properly) never been thought to
apply'").
170. See Leading Cases, supra note 164, at 199 ("Restrictions on advertising thus enable
large, established law firms to maintain disproportionate power in the legal community.").
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ues to grow. However, this Note ultimately rejects as unsound and un-
constitutional the suggestion by some commentators that ethics rules for
blawgers are only a matter of time.'72 On another level, it is unclear why
states might choose to develop such rules in the first place. Examples
abound of bad law created on the cutting edges of technology.' 73 For
states to create regulations which limit the development of one of the
Internet's most rapidly evolving innovations seems a dramatic overreac-
tion to a problem of limited scope.
Though this Note espouses an anti-regulatory thesis, it supports the
use of disclaimers, more to protect blawgers themselves than to protect
the public at large. Disclaims should not be considered as a regulatory
framework but rather a means for blawgers to avoid the impact of some
regulations. Indeed, disclaimers may be an effective way for blawgers to
avoid potential lawsuits and ethics complaints. This defensive posture
recognizes the stark reality of American jurisprudence: despite the merits
of the claim, people are going to sue. Disclaimers are a rather innocuous
solution, implicating none of the chilling effects outlined in this Note
and promoting the medium by insulating authors from liability.
It is difficult to predict where and when, if at all, the blawgoshpere
and traditional attorney rules of ethics will clash. Is the blawgosphere
truly a "radical" new medium that confounds traditional rules, or is it
simply a new iteration of communications technology? The answer re-
mains unclear. However, this uncertainty is not cause for alarm. To the
contrary, regulators and courts will best serve the public by allowing this
innovative new medium to evolve independent of outside intervention so
that the blawgosphere may realize its full potential.
171. See supra Part III.C-D.
172. Ribstein, supra note 90, at 215 ("Given blogs' diversity, multiple codes likely will
develop for particular categories, such as for academics and lawyers. Some specific rules
might develop to suit blogs generally."). Calls for a code of ethics have in fact subsequently
emerged from within the blogosphere. Brad Stone, A Call for Manners in the World of Nasty
Blogs, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 9, 2007, at Al.
173. See Winick, supra note 120, at 1495, ("Whenever new technology becomes preva-
lent, the law enters a period of struggle to find adequate means for resolving disputes
involving that technology, and for protecting the rights of people effected by it. We are now in
such a period." (quoting Andrew Grosso, Implications of the Information Super-highway for
Commerce Security, and Law Enforcement, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 481, 482 (1994)).
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